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Introduction:  Has China Created a Bubble à la the U.S. 2000-2006 Housing Bubble? 
 Between 2000 and 2006, American home prices surged 130%, with the median sale price 
of U.S. homes reaching a peak of $224,000 in July, 2006.  Over the next six years, the median 
sale price fell by $72,000, reaching a record low of $152,000 in February, 2012.   The dramatic 1
decline in the U.S. housing market is widely-regarded as the primary cause of the 2007/2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis, which plunged the United States into almost unprecedented financial turmoil and 
contributed to a global recession that lasted four years. 
 During this time, global economic growth cratered from 4.1% in 2006 to a low of -2.1% 
in 2009.  However, the People’s Republic of China was seemingly immune to the effects of the 
global recession.   Many commentators attributed China’s success to its prompt and enormous 2
stimulus package, which boosted the Chinese economy and allowed it to maintain a 9.2% growth 
rate in 2009, down only 0.4% from 2008, even as the recessionary contraction in foreign 
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economies reduced demand for Chinese exports.  The RMB 4 trillion stimulus package, which 
was proposed in November, 2008 and approved by the National People’s Congress as part of the 
2009 budget (up 22.1% from 2008), was equivalent to 14% of China’s 2008 Gross Domestic 
Product.  Bank lending — which was used to finance the majority of the stimulus — exploded. 
Since 2008, banking assets have grown by an astonishing $14 trillion, “equal to the entire size of 
the U.S. commercial banking sector.”  3
 In the ensuing lending binge, enormous amounts of money flowed into the real estate 
market, further fueling a residential housing rally that had begun in 2000-2005 and in many ways 
exceeded the period between 2000 and 2006 in the United States.  Since 1980, Chinese housing 
prices have increased almost 700%, compared to 370% in the United States;  at its peak, the 4
price-income ratio across China averaged 11:1, more than double that in the United States.   In 5
response to limitations implemented by Beijing, housing price growth fell in 2012, only to come 
roaring back through 2013, reaching a year-on-year increase of 10%.  New housing prices 
slipped into negative growth in May, 2014,  with recent data showing record drops in February, 6
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2015.     Alarmingly, residential housing price inflation in China, which reached a peak in early 7
2014, is now falling at a faster rate than in the U.S. prior to the recession.   Two years after hous8 -
ing price inflation peaked, the U.S. entered a devastating recession: the median net worth of U.S. 
families fell 39% from $126,400 in 2007 to $77,300 in 2010;  according to the American Enter9 -
prise Institute, one-fifth of accumulated household wealth was wiped-out in 2008 alone, the same 
year Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and other financial giants collapsed.   The extreme deterio10 -
ration of American household balance sheets — housing typically represented 75-80% of house-
hold assets — not only precipitated the meltdown but also caused the pace of economic recovery 
to be the slowest since World War II.  By 2013, 27% of U.S. mortgages remained underwater, 
severely constraining consumer spending and economic growth.  11
 With so much at stake, commentators often warn of parallels between the Chinese hous-
ing market and 2000-2006 in the U.S., arguing that the Chinese housing market has created an 
asset price bubble, a phenomenon defined by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago as when “the 
market price of an asset exceeds its price determined by fundamental factors by a significant 
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amount for a prolonged period of time.”   Such commentators warn of an impending “Minsky 12
Moment" — a sudden collapse of asset prices as a result of investors’ unsustainably leveraged 
positions that destroys wealth and results in a recession — à la 2007-2008 in the United States. 
 However, unlike in the U.S., the dramatic rise in the value of housing in China — al-
though exacerbated by local government policy that for a time ensured that prices could only go 
up — was supported by strong fundamentals.  Consequently, China’s housing market does not 
seem to have generated a particularly excessive bubble, and only a modest correction is likely. 
Even as prices continue to fall, China is unlikely to experience a “Minsky Moment” because the 
financing structures and lending practices common in China’s residential housing market pro-
duce far less risk than those common in the United States.  Consequently, the decline in housing 
values will not destroy massive amounts of Chinese household wealth as it did in the United 
States; in fact, the enormous growth of “housing wealth” has been largely illusory.   A recession 
is still possible, however it would be as a result of reduced economic activity and increased un-
employment, rather than a deterioration of household balance sheets. 
I.  Local Government Involvement: Exacerbating Land and Housing Price Growth 
 Experience has made Chinese leaders acutely aware of the danger rampant speculation 
fueled by ever-rising prices poses to the housing market.  On April 6, 1988 the island of Hainan 
was classified as a Special Economic Zone, resulting in a real estate boom that lasted until 1993 
when Premier Zhu Rongji pushed to clamp down on the economy.  When the market crashed, 
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Hainan was left with RMB 30 billion of bad debt (equivalent to 10% of the entire national bud-
get) and 8% of nationwide nonperforming property assets.  Has the acceleration of housing price 
growth — a result of monetary policy — been a symptom of a bubble reminiscent of the specula-
tion-induced Hainan Boom and Bust? 
 In China, the People’s Bank of China “formally operates under the leadership of the State 
Council,” making monetary policy an official tool of the Chinese government.   Over the past 13
15 years, Chinese policy — especially at the local level — has supported consistent increases in 
the price of land, which translates to high housing prices.  The relationship between land prices 
and housing prices is evident by the correlation between the percent change in new home prices 
and the transaction value of land over time.   Chinese policy has fueled rising housing prices 14
because of the strategy pursued by local governments to “unlock” the value of land in China. 
Beginning in 1994 — shortly after the Hainan Boom and Bust — local governments were re-
stricted from issuing bonds by Zhu Rongji.  In 1998, Wuhu Construction Investment Company, a 
local government financing vehicle, invented a method of leveraging the future value of the land 
it administered to get around the ban on direct financing.  With the backing of the local govern-
ment, the L.G.F.V. (effectively an off-balance-sheet entity) would go into debt to fund massive 
investments in public works and development, secured and financed by land grants (a 1988 
amendment to the Chinese Constitution allows the government to transfer the right to use and 
profit from, but not ownership of, land for a certain amount of time).  The land would increase in 
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value as a result of the development project, creating a “virtuous circle.”  This strategy was 
enormously successful and consequently replicated thousands of times across China.  In 2013 
alone, land leases brought in RMB 3.9 trillion to local government coffers, representing 35% of 
fiscal revenue.  However, this method of funding is increasingly a burden to the local govern15 -
ments.  According to the National Audit Office, local governments are indebted to the tune of 
RMB 17.9 trillion, roughly 30% of Gross Domestic Product.  This measure is comprised of RMB 
10.9 trillion in debt and the full-value of RMB 2.7 trillion in debt guarantees and RMB 4.3 tril-
lion in implicit debt guarantees (historically, the government has only been on the hook for 
19.13% of these contingent liabilities, consequently RMB 17.9 trillion is a high estimate).  16
Moreover, as a result of diminishing returns, investments in public works and infrastructure will 
be unlikely to continue to produce sufficiently substantive improvements.  Tellingly, between 
2005 and 2014, the transaction value of land in China experienced wild fluctuations.  According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the accumulated growth rate of transaction value of 
land reached a low of -45.7% in February, 2007 and a high of 123.5% in June, 2010,  making it 17
a highly volatile and unreliable source of fiscal revenue going forward. 
 Beijing has recognized the problem of local government financing and has moved to 
remedy it.  In the long-run, the National People’s Congress has passed legislation overturning the 
1994 ban, enabling provincial-level (but not city- and county-level) authorities to issue debt to 
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finance investment projects (not day-to-day outlays or credit guarantees).  The central govern-
ment is also experimenting by allowing certain local governments to assess property tax.  Cur-
rently, local governments represent 80% of spending but only 40% of tax revenue, and without 
direct control over taxation, land sales are often viewed as the only viable way for local govern-
ments to make ends meet.   In the short-term, the central government is preparing to allow local 18
governments to refinance upwards of RMB 1 trillion in high-interest debt, saving upwards of 
RMB 50 billion in interest costs in 2015 alone, with the possibility of additional refinancing 
down the road.   China’s proven track record of successfully managing the excesses of the Chi19 -
nese economy (for example, “on average, high inflationary episodes in China were over thirty 
months [earlier] than similar episodes in market economies between the 1960s and the 1990s” ) 20
suggests that these strategies will be successful. 
 The strategy pursued by local governments created the widespread belief that housing 
prices could only go up.  In this regard, the housing market is similar to the Hainan Boom and 
Bust and 2000-2006 in the United States.  With reforms, local governments will overtime be-
come less dependent on land sales, which will have a cooling — and stabilizing — effect on the 
housing market.  However, the market remains buttressed by strong fundamentals. 
II.  Burgeoning Demand and Insufficient Supply: The Ultimate Floor on Housing Prices 
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 An analysis of the forces shaping demand and the reality of supply in China suggests that 
the housing market justifiably produced rapidly increasing valuations beginning in 2000, al-
though local government policy exacerbated housing price growth.  The strong fundamentals 
create a floor below which housing prices cannot fall; this floor will likely remain relatively high 
in the near future, and consequently Chinese housing prices are unlikely to see devaluation as 
dramatic as in the United States. 
 In 2005, Chen Yuan — Chairman of the China Development Bank — famously noted 
that “urbanization is the most important and enduring motive force [sic] in stimulating consump-
tion and investment in China’s domestic economy.”   Urbanization — the relocation of millions 21
of farmers to urban areas in the most massive human migration in history — has also been the 
engine that drives the Chinese housing market.  The scale of China's urbanization is difficult to 
comprehend.  In 2011, China became a majority urban country for the first time in its 5,000 year 
history, with 50.6% of its population living in cities;  today, there are over 150 Chinese cities 22
with over one million residents.  While urbanization concentrated millions of citizens and created 
enormous markets across China, economic growth made it possible for them to become home-
owners.  Between 2000 and 2011, household disposable income grew at a much faster rate than 
did home prices, indicating that the housing market was not solely dependent on a constant in-
flux of new homebuyers.  23
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 The sheer size of China’s population ensures that the economic engine of urbanization 
can continue to operate for years to come.  For example, over the next decade China will move 
an additional 250 million rural residents into newly built cities  at a cost of RMB 40 trillion.  24 25
Going forward, urban areas themselves will also serve as increasingly important sources of new 
demand.  Although most Chinese now live in cities, 250 million are migrant workers — only 
36% actually have an urban hukou.   This “internal passport” is the key to the most important 26
benefits of urban residency, including the right to participate in government-subsidized housing 
projects.  China plans to give urban hukou to an average of 17 million migrant workers a year, 
adding 100 million people to the pool of potential homebuyers by 2020 (by that time there will 
still be more than 200 million migrant workers without an urban hukou).  27
 Not only is participation in government-subsidized housing projects restricted to the 
holders of urban hukou, but the supply of such residences is also severely limited.  Beginning in 
the 1990s, work units ceased providing housing to their employees.  In order to ensure that the 
transition to a market-based housing market would be relatively smooth, the Chinese government 
heavily promoted the construction of economically affordable housing in addition to commodity 
houses.  In 2000-2001, “economically affordable” housing — the purchase of which requires 
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proof of economic hardship and income and asset verification — accounted for nearly 25% of 
living area sold.  However, by 2010 only 3% of investment in residential real estate was for 
“economically affordable” housing, compared to almost 20% in 1999.   China’s “Rat Tribe” — 28
the million residents living in unsafe, illegal rooms built haphazardly in bomb shelters and stor-
age basements under Beijing — is symptomatic of this shortage.  As the supply of affordable 
housing shrank, competition for the remaining units intensified, driving up the price.  This im-
balance was recognized by the Chinese government, which spent nearly $800 billion to construct 
an additional 36 million affordable housing units by 2015.   Since 2008, the Chinese govern29 -
ment has also begun to shift its focus away from promoting private homeownership and towards 
low-rent programs, a change that will greatly help the poorest urban residents.  China’s rental 
market remains dramatically underdeveloped; for example, many investors with hundreds of 
homes in their portfolios do not bother to find tenants. 
 Incredibly, 22.4% of urban homes that have been sold — some 49 million units represent-
ing RMB 4.2 trillion in mortgages — are vacant,  to the extent that it would take 14 months for 30
the market to absorb all unsold homes in first-tier cities and 16 months in second-tier cities.  31
This phenomenon has given rise to the so-called “Ghost Cities” (more often than not, such 
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“cities” are actually new suburban developments associated with larger, more established cities). 
Most of the vacant homes are held by investors and speculators, and their repeated buying and 
selling has come to be known as “stir-frying.” This is not an indication of “irrational exuberance” 
in the Chinese housing market; rather, it is a sign that China’s financial markets are severely re-
pressed and that the availability of alternative investments is limited.  Over time, China’s contin-
ued financial deepening will reduce the tendency for investors to hoard so many units.  More-
over, this so-called “stir-frying” has not influenced nationwide housing prices; studies indicate 
that during this period of time “monetary policy clearly accelerated home price growth, while 
speculative investment inflow did not have a significant impact on home price growth after con-
trolling for money supply growth.”  32
 In general, policy and cultural factors have had a a series of stabilizing effects on the pub-
lic’s enthusiasm for home ownership, which kept borrowers from taking advantage of the “cer-
tainty” that housing prices will rise.  As a result, the Chinese housing market is not at risk of 
generating a “Minsky Moment.” 
III.  Strict Mortgage Practices and Conservative Homeowners:  A Highly Resilient Market 
 The methods of financing used to fund investments can increase the risk of a bust even 
when demand and supply are in equilibrium.  When it is widely assumed that prices can only go 
up, investors may feel confident that they can increase their leverage ratio to an unsustainable 
level.  For example, between 2000 and 2006, American homeowners were so highly leveraged 
that many would have been wiped-out by even a modest decline in the value of their homes, 
which is ultimately what occurred.   In China, the widespread belief that prices can only go up 
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has existed for over a decade, but the limitations placed on both borrowers and lenders made it 
impossible for most borrowers to take advantage of the rise. 
 The first residential mortgage in China was issued by the China Construction bank in 
1986.  Since the late 1990s, mortgage lending has expanded by an average of 80% annually.  33
Now, mortgage debt comprises between 80-90% of Chinese household liabilities, the vast major-
ity of which is variable rate.   Although the Chinese mortgage market is enormous, it is extreme34 -
ly conservative.  By law, “the loan amount [of a mortgage] may not exceed 80 percent of the ap-
praisal value or the purchase price of the house, whichever is smaller, and [the] payment to in-
come ratio should not exceed 70 [percent].”   In 2012, the national average down payment was 35
40%, double the minimum requirement and much higher than the “zero-down” mortgages popu-
lar in the United States.   Mainland Chinese interest rates also tend to be more robust than their 36
international counterparts; H.S.B.C., for example, is able to offer a USD lending rate 39% lower 
than the People’s Bank of China’s RMB Commercial Base Lending Rate of 6.55%.  37
 The large down payment requirements and sturdy interest rates not only insulate Chinese 
borrowers and lenders against dramatic devaluations, but also limit mortgages to households 
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with strong finances, almost guaranteeing the absence of subprime borrowers.  In China, 69% of 
mortgage borrowers have relatively high incomes, and default risk is less than 1%.   Further38 -
more, securitization is virtually nonexistent (a pilot program begun in 2005 was cancelled be-
cause of its role in the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis) and the secondary mortgage market is under-
developed, requiring that banks hold the mortgages they issue until maturity, which gives them a 
strong incentive to lend only to borrowers with the ability to repay.  By contrast, American 
banks, knowing that government-sponsored institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were standing by to purchase the mortgages they issued, had no incentive to scrutinize subprime 
borrowers.  Rather than purchase mortgages from banks, which results in a focus on quantity 
over quality, the Chinese equivalent of Fannie and Freddie — The Housing Provident Fund — 
administers a mandatory savings plan, allowing for withdrawals for home purchases and often 
extending favorable loans to borrowers of modest means.  In 2008, it had a balance of $177 bil-
lion and extended $30 billion in loans,  suggesting that it is well-capitalized. 39
 The conservative nature of Chinese lenders is well-known, however the culture of home-
ownership in China receives less attention.  Chinese borrowers not only make high down pay-
ments, but their equity-debt ratio rises as their mortgage debt is amortized because they are un-
able and unwilling to borrow against the equity in their homes.  In contrast, American borrowers 
rarely increase their equity-debt ratio.  Between 2002 and 2007, “American households extracted 
$2.3 trillion from their houses,” with the average American family consequently owing 138% if 
 LaForge, The Silver Lining in the Red Giant: China’s Residential Mortgage Laws Promote Temperance Among 38
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its after-tax income.   The American practice of repeated refinancing meant that when home 40
prices started to decline, millions of Americans with little to no equity whatsoever were under-
water.  The fact that millions of Americans were continuously increasing their mortgage debt also 
meant that on the eve of the crisis, residential mortgage debt as a percent of G.D.P. was over 
80%; by contrast, Chinese residential mortgage debt as a share of G.D.P. had not even reached 
20% by 2012, three years after the stimulus package (in fact, Chinese citizens are often baffled 
by the notion of “refinancing,” insisting that the logic must be flawed).   According to the China 41
Household Finance Survey from the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in 
Chengdu, only 3% of Chinese households would be underwater after a 30% decline in housing 
prices, a quantity that would have a negligible effect on the non-performing loan rate.   More42 -
over, the bankruptcies would be concentrated in the upper-classes, with 11.2% of vacant homes 
— owned by wealthier families — underwater, compared to only 3.3% of occupied homes.  43
IV.  Housing and the Chinese Wealth Effect:  The Destruction of Illusory Household Wealth 
 By and large, Chinese households have not taken advantage of the increase in household 
wealth that the rising value of their homes has generated.  In fact, the increase in household 
wealth has been illusory and its potential destruction will have little to no effect on the Chinese 
economy.  This is because the value of housing in China has not been part of the Chinese “wealth 
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effect,” i.e. changes in economic behavior — especially household spending — that result from 
an improvement or deterioration of household balance sheets. 
 That the Chinese and American “wealth effects” are not the same has been widely ac-
knowledged.  For example, Michael Pettis, a professor at Peking University, has argued that 
whereas conventional economic logic in the West suggests that rising rates increase the cost of 
holding cash and should result in more bank deposits, the Chinese tend to target a certain level of 
savings, higher rates therefore allow them to fulfill their savings goal with smaller deposits. 
“Chinese households, in other words, should feel richer when the deposit rate rises and poorer 
when it declines, in which case rising rates should be associated with rising, not declining, con-
sumption.”   Although rising rates generally decrease consumption in the U.S. (as consumers 44
put more of their money in the bank to take advantage of the high interest rates), rising housing 
prices have the opposite effect. 
 Most economists hold that “increasing [U.S.] house prices increase [American] home-
owners’ wealth, which in turn increases consumption.”   In fact, “it is estimated that a one-time 45
decrease in [U.S.] housing wealth of 1% leads to a 0.10% decrease in [American] consumer 
spending.”   Whereas American consumption tracks home prices, Chinese consumption does 46
not increase in tandem with housing prices.  Since 2000, as housing prices have rallied, con-
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sumption as a percentage of G.D.P. has fallen dramatically,  and the increase in absolute terms 47
has been modest.  This indicates that, unlike in the United States, housing ironically play little to 
no role in the Chinese “wealth effect.”  However, it is not simply the case that Chinese household 
debt is so low that they can afford to lose substantial assets without suffering bankruptcy; the de-
struction of the nominal “housing wealth” Chinese families have accumulated is illusory and 
does not constitute the real destruction of Chinese wealth. 
 At first glance, housing is an enormous source of wealth for Chinese households: housing 
assets represent 40.7% of household wealth in China, compared to 32.3% of household wealth in 
the United States; the homeownership rate in China is 85.39% in urban areas and 92.6% in rural 
areas, compared to 65% in the United States; most surprisingly, the median capital gain on the 
purchase of a first apartment is around 46%, although it reaches 385% in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen.  48
 However, in China home equity can only be accessed when a home is sold, not through 
refinancing; furthermore, the underdevelopment of the secondary market means that the capital 
gains — which are often 300% in major cities — are never realized.  Tellingly, the statistics 
available in China only measure changes in new home prices, whereas the American data avail-
able through companies such as Zillow factor in the secondary market as well.  Were the millions 
of second-hand homes to be put on the market, supply would skyrocket and prices would plum-
met.  If accurate, the implications for urban Chinese households (which are, on paper, quite 
 Financial System Review, (Bank of Canada, December, 2012), accessed March 29, 2015, http://www.bankofcana47 -
da.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/fsr-1212.pdf.
  Gan Li, “Findings from China Household Finance Survey,” Texas A&M University and Southwestern University 48
of Finance and Economics, January, 2013, accessed March 29, 2015, http://econweb.tamu.edu/gan/Report-
English-Dec-2013.pdf.
wealthy) would be great.  It would imply that the full value of housing assets (which averages 
RMB 9,300,000 with a median of RMB 4,000,000 for holders of urban hukou, compared to the 
average American equity position of $93,407 ) should not be included in the calculation of 49
household wealth, which is thought to average RMB 23,750,000 with a median of RMB 
3,730,000 for holders of urban hukou.   Further research is needed to determine the likely value 50
that can ultimately be extracted from houses in the secondary market, but it is almost certainly 
less than 100%; since the median housing assets held by holders of urban hukou is larger than 
that group’s median net worth, even a small drop in the value of housing assets would represent a 
dramatic “loss.” 
  Since Chinese borrowers have high equity-debt ratios, they are unlikely to be foreclosed 
upon in a crash; since Chinese homeowners cannot access home equity through refinancing, the 
secondary market is underdeveloped and the enormous capital gains therefore imaginary, they 
are less likely than Americans to feel resentment if the value of their home falls below the value 
of their remaining mortgage, and the effect on spending and other economic measures would be 
limited.  Potential resentment is also limited by cultural factors that place an enormous value on 
homeownership, whatever the cost.  For example, a man is expected to have a home prior to mar-
riage, and pilot schemes of reverse mortgages were relatively unsuccessful because of the prefer-
ence of older Chinese to make their home available for the next generation.  Overall, Chinese 
enthusiasm for homeownership is in spite of the fact that they view housing as an expense rather 
 “Z.1: Financial Accounts of the United States,” Federal Reserve, December 11, 2014, accessed March 29, 2015, 49
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm.
 Gan Li, “Findings from China Household Finance Survey.”50
than as a productive asset — Chinese borrowers typically use an astonishing 30-50% of their 
monthly income to repay their mortgage, creating the so-called fangnu, or “Housing Slaves”  51
IV.  Conclusion:  Assessing the Recessionary Danger Posed by the Housing Market 
 The efforts already underway to reform local government finances will reduce the ten-
dency of local governments to inflate land and housing prices.  Moreover, unlike in the U.S., the 
dramatic rise in the value of housing in China has been supported by strong fundamentals, in-
cluding the on-going process of urbanization, rising incomes and limited supply.  Going forward, 
government initiatives to increase the construction of affordable housing, hukou reform and fi-
nancial deepening will limit price drops and promote a healthy housing market.  Overall, China’s 
housing market does not seem to have generated a particularly excessive bubble, and only a 
modest correction is likely. 
 Even as prices continue to fall in the short-run, China is unlikely to experience a “Minsky 
Moment” because the financing structures and lending practices common in China’s residential 
housing market produce far less risk than those common in the United States.  Chinese lending 
standards are strict and Chinese borrowers have large equity positions in their homes. Conse-
quently, the decline in housing values will not destroy massive amounts of Chinese household 
wealth as it did in the United States.   In fact, this “housing wealth” has been largely illusory — 
it cannot be accessed because Chinese homeowners cannot refinance their mortgages and the 
secondary housing market is underdeveloped.  Consequently, its destruction would have little to 
no effect on the Chinese economy. 
 “China Housing Slaves Helping Property Rebound: Mortgages,” Bloomberg News, February 19, 2013, accessed 51
February 1, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-19/china-housing-slaves-helping-
property-rebound-mortgages.
 The collapse of the residential housing market could still result in a  recession, however it 
would be as a result of reduced economic activity and increased unemployment, rather than a 
deterioration of household balance sheets. The residential housing market is one of the most 
important pillars of the Chinese economy, and its collapse could cause a recession.  According to 
the I.M.F., real estate and construction “accounted for 15% of 2012 G.D.P., a quarter of fixed-
asset investment, 14% of total urban employment, and nearly 20% of bank loans.”  52
 When land prices began to fall in the summer of 2011, the National Reform Commission 
had to step in to stop Caixin  — China’s The Economist — from publishing a front-page story 
titled, “Are the Defaults Starting?”  In March, 2015 Kaisa Group Holdings, Limited, a developer 
based in Shenzhen, did in fact “default,” missing $51.6 million in interest payments even after 
allowing for a thirty-day grace period.   Although Kaisa’s missed payments may be the result of 53
an anti-corruption investigation rather than a sign of the company’s insolvency, it does not 
change the fact that more research is needed to determine the true health of Chinese property de-
velopers.  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